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1. Introduction
Abject poverty has been attributed to be the root cause behind the widespread existence
of child labour in the developing countries. Therefore, it is a commonly held view that
poverty alleviation programs should vigorously be resorted to for mitigating the
problem.1 Empirical studies have revealed that the incidence of child labour has
decreased satisfactorily in most of the developing economies2 although incomes of the
poorer section of the population have not changed significantly in absolute terms over the
last two decades.3
The problem of child labour has two sides: demand and supply. Countries with high
incidence of poverty undertake policies which are designed to increase earning
opportunities of the poor. Consequently, these policies are expected to produce
favourable effect on the incidence of child labour through the supply side. A pertinent
question is whether policies which address only the supply side of the problem can
indeed be effective in alleviating this problem. This is particularly important because of
the empirical findings that the incidence of child labour in the developing nations has
decreased satisfactorily although poverty has not changed much during the liberalized
economic regime. These evidences suggest that favourable effect on child labour must
1 See World Development Report (1995), Basu and Van (1998), Basu (2000) and Bonnet (1993)
among others.
2
 ILO (2006) has reported that the number of economically active children in the 5-14 age group
declined by 11 per cent in 2004 from the 2000 figure. The decline is sharpest for Latin America
and Caribbean, whereas Asia and Pacific and Sub-Saharan Africa registered very small decline in
activity rates.
3
 See, for example, Wade (2004), Reddy and Minoiu (2005), Wade and Wolf (2002), Khan
(1998) and Tendulkar et al. (1996).
3have come from the demand side. This urgently calls for theoretical explanation that
might be able to show why policy interventions affecting the supply side alone cannot
effectively solve the prevalence of the evil in the system and demand side policies should
be given more priorities so as to tackle the child labour situation in the society.
According to ILO (2002) the concentration of child labour is the highest in the rural
sector of a developing economy and child labour is used intensively directly or indirectly
in the agricultural sector4. Besides, agricultural dualism is a common symptom of the
developing countries. The distinction between advanced and backward agriculture can be
made on the basis of inputs used, economies of scale, efficiency and elasticity of
substitution between different factors of production. In backward agriculture, the
production techniques are primitive, use of capital is very low and child labour can
almost do whatever adult labour does. Farming in backward agriculture is mostly done by
using bullocks and ploughs and the cattle-feeding is entirely done by child labour.5
Besides, at the time of sowing of seeds and harvest children are often used in the family
farms for helping adult members of the family. The advanced agricultural sector, on the
other hand, uses mechanised techniques of production and uses agricultural machineries
like tractors, seeders/planters, sprayers and harvesters etc. and therefore does not require
child labour in its production process.
Agriculture in many countries is supported by government’s subsidy policies in the form
of price support, export subsidy, credit support etc.  In a developing country like India,
farmers in backward agriculture are given price support with a view to protect themselves
from sharp fall in their product prices during the times of over supply in the market.
government’s Minimum Support Price (or Producers Support Price) mechanism is a very
common form of government subsidy policy directed towards backward agriculture.6
4 According to the ILO (2002) report (figure 4, pp. 36), more than 70 per cent of economically
active children in the developing countries are engaged in agriculture and allied sectors.
5 See Gupta (2000) in this context.
6 See footnote 9 for details.
4These types of subsidy scheme are designed to benefit the poorer section of the working
population who are the potential suppliers of child labour. It is therefore natural to expect
that these fiscal measures will raise the earning opportunities of the poor households
which in turn will lower the supply of child labour by these families through positive
income effect. However, the matter is not as straightforward as it appears to be at the first
sight.  This is because apart from their impact on adult wages, these policies affect the
output composition of different sectors and the demand for child labour and therefore
earning opportunities by children as well.  An expansion of backward agriculture
resulting from an increase in Producers Support Price , for example, will result in a
higher demand for child labour and raise the use of child labour in the economy. Even if
there is a positive income effect due to increase in adult wages, the net effect on child
labour may be perverse. Any policy effect on the child labour incidence should, therefore,
be carried out in a multi-sector general equilibrium framework so as to capture various
demand and supply linkages that may exist in the system.
The existing theoretical literature on child labour7, however, has not so far paid sufficient
attention to identify both the demand and supply side effects of the poverty alleviation
programs on the problem of child labour in a developing economy with agricultural
dualism. The focus of the present paper is to examine how different policies which are
primarily designed to eradicate poverty affect the incidence of child labour in the society.
We also analyze how these policies impinge on the welfare of the child labour-supplying
families. A three-sector full-employment general equilibrium model with child labour
and agricultural dualism has been considered for the analytical purpose. The economy is
divided into two agricultural and one manufacturing sectors. One of the two agricultural
sectors is backward agriculture (sector 2) that uses child labour. In this set-up we have
examined the consequence of a price subsidy policy (in the form of increasing the
Minimum Support Price) designed to benefit backward agriculture and the poorer section
7 See Basu an Van (1998), Basu (1999), Gupta (2000, 2002), Jaferey and Lahiri (2002), Ranjan
(1999, 2001), Baland and Robinson (2000), Chaudhuri (2010), Chaudhuri and Dwibedi (2006,
2007), Dwibedi and Chaudhuri (2010) among others. In the literature the supply of child labour
has been attributed to factors such as abject poverty, lack of educational facilities and poor quality
of schooling, capital market imperfection, parental attitudes including the objectives to maximize
present income etc.
5of the working population on the aggregate supply of child labour in the economy. Our
analysis finds that a price subsidy to backward agriculture is most likely to produce a
perverse effect on the child labour incidence even though it raises the non-child labour
income and welfare of the child labour-supplying families. On the other hand a policy of
directly subsidizing advanced agriculture will be effective in lessening the child labour
incidence but at the cost of lowering adult income and family welfare. We advocate in
favour of policies which are favourable from the supply side as well as the demand side
of the child labour problem. For example, a policy of growth with foreign capital will
raise the income of the poorer section of the society and at the same time encourages
technologies which lower child labour demand. A strategy like this will, therefore, be
effective in lessening the gravity of the child labour problem and at the same time
welfare-improving.
2. The model
We consider a small open economy with three sectors: two agricultural and one
manufacturing. The two agricultural sectors produce two different commodities. Sector 1
is the advanced agricultural sector that produces its output, 1X , by means of adult
labour ( )L , land ( )N  and capital ( )K . Capital used in this sector includes both physical
capital like tractors and harvesters and working capital required for purchasing material
inputs like fertilizers, pesticides, weedicides etc. The other agricultural sector, we call it
backward agriculture (sector 2), produces its output, 2X , using adult labour, child
labour ( )CL  and land. As the backward agriculture uses primitive production techniques,
we assume that Sector 2 does not require capital in its production. The land-output ratios
in sectors 1, and 2 ( 1Na and 2Na ) are assumed to be technologically given. This
assumption not only simplifies the algebra but also can be defended as follows. In one
hectare of land the number of saplings that can be sown is given. There should be a
minimum gap between two saplings and land cannot be substituted by other factors of
production.
6It is sensible to assume that the backward agricultural sector is more adult labour-
intensive vis-à-vis the advanced agricultural sector with respect to land. This implies
that 2 1
2 1
L L
N N
a a
a a
 , where sjia are input-output ratios. Available empirical evidence suggests
that in developing economies child labour is used intensively directly or indirectly in
backward agriculture that uses primitive production techniques. The advanced
agricultural sector, on the other hand, uses mechanised techniques of production and does
not require child labour in production. Child labour is, therefore, specific to backward
agriculture.8 Advanced agriculture is the export sector while backward agriculture
produces a final agricultural commodity which is consumed domestically. The price of
the latter sector’s product is administratively determined by the government.9 In the two
agricultural sectors adult workers receive competitive wage, W . Sector 3 is the import-
competing sector that produces a manufacturing commodity, 3X using adult labour and
capital. Child labour is not used in the manufacturing sector also. This is a formal sector
of the economy where the use of child labour is legally banned.10 It faces a unionised
labour market where workers receive a contractual wage W withW W . The adult
8 See footnote 10 in this context.
9 In a developing country for protecting the interests of the small and marginal farmers and the
poorer section of the consumers the government often tinkers with market mechanism by its
procurement and distribution activities. It declares in advance the minimum support prices
(MSPs)  for essential crops at which public agencies procure foodgrains and other essential crops
from farmers. On the other hand, it distributes foodgrains among the weaker section of consumers
at subsidized issue prices through its public distribution system. Another important objective of
these operations is to maintain satisfactory level of operational and buffer stocks of foodgrains to
ensure National Food Security. All these practices are being followed in a country like India. See
http://fciweb.nic.in/ for more details.
10 According to ILO (2002) more than 70 per cent of economically active children in the
developing countries are engaged in agriculture and allied sectors and less than 9 per cent are
involved in manufacturing. Besides, child workers are used in informal manufacturing sector
which constitutes unregistered units that mainly produce intermediate goods for the formal
manufacturing sector. However, even if one introduces an informal manufacturing sector where
child labour, adult labour and capital are used to produce a non-traded input for the formal sector
the basic results of this paper still hold under different sufficient conditions containing terms of
relative intensities in which child labour and other two inputs are used in the two child labour-
using sectors.
7labour allocation mechanism is as follows. Adult workers first try to get employment in
the manufacturing sector that offers the higher wage and those who are unable to find
employment in the said sector are automatically absorbed in the two informal sectors11
(agricultural sectors), as the wage rate there is perfectly flexible. Capital is completely
mobile between sectors 1 and 3. Owing to the small open economy assumption prices of
the two traded commodities (1 and 3) are given internationally. Price of the product
produced by backward agriculture is exogenous to the model. Competitive markets,
excepting the formal sector labour market, constant returns to scale (CRS) technologies
with positive and diminishing marginal productivities of inputs12 and full-employment of
resources are assumed. Commodity 1 is chosen as the numeraire.
The following three equations present the zero-profit conditions relating to the three
sectors of the economy.
1 1 1 1L N KWa Ra ra   (1)
2 2 2 2L C C NWa W a Ra P    (2)
3 3 3L KWa ra P  (3)
where R , r and CW  stand for return to land, return to capital and child wage rate,
respectively.
Complete utilization of adult labour, capital, land and child labour imply the following
four equations, respectively.
LXaXaXa LLL  332211 (4)
KXaXa KK  3311 (5)
11 There is a vast theoretical literature that discusses various aspects of the informal sector in a
developing economy. This includes works of Chaudhuri and Banerjee (2007), Marjit (2003),
Chaudhuri et al. (2006), Chaudhuri (2001, 2002, 2003, 2005, 2006 a, b, 2007, 2010 a, b, c, 2011
a, b), Chaudhuri and Mukhopadhyay (2002 a, b), Chaudhuri and Dwibedi (2007), Chaudhuri and
Yabuuchi (2010) etc.
12 The land-output ratios in the two agricultural sectors ( 1Na and 2Na ) have been assumed to be
technologically given. However, the other inputs exhibit CRS between themselves.
8NXaXa NN  2211 (6)
CC LXa 22 (7)
While endowments of adult labour, land and capital13 are fixed in the economy, the
aggregate supply of child labour, CL , is endogenously determined from the utility
maximizing behavior of the households.
2.1. Household behaviour
We derive the supply function of child labour from the utility maximizing behaviour of
the representative altruistic poor household. There are L numbers of working families,
which are classified into two groups with respect to the earnings of their adult members.
The adult workers who work in the higher paid manufacturing sector comprise the richer
section of the working population. On the contrary, labourers who are engaged in the two
agricultural sectors constitute the poorer section. There is now considerable evidence and
theoretical reason for believing that, in developing countries, parents send their children
to work out of sheer poverty.  Following the ‘Luxury Axiom’14 of Basu and Van (1998),
we assume that there exists a critical level of family (or adult labour) income, *W , such
that the parents will send their children out to work if and only if the actual adult wage
rate is less than this critical level. We assume that each worker in the manufacturing
sector earns a wage income,W , sufficiently higher than this critical level15. So, these
13
  The capital endowment of the economy may, however, increase in the presence of foreign
direct investment (FDI).
14
 Basu and Van (1998) have shown that if child labour and adult labour are substitutes
(Substitution Axiom) and if child leisure is a luxury commodity to the poor households (Luxury
Axiom), unfavourable adult labour market, responsible for low adult wage rate, is the driving
force behind the incidence of child labour. According to the Luxury Axiom, there exists a critical
level of adult wage rate, and any adult worker earning below this wage rate, considers himself as
poor and does not have the luxury to send his offspring to schools. He is forced to send his
children to the job market to supplement low family income out of sheer poverty.
15 We can also quantify this critical value in our model. From equation (10) we can say that
0Cl   if (1 ) Cn WW 
 .
9workers do not send their children to work. On the other hand, adult workers employed in
the two agricultural sectors earn W amount of wage income (we assume that this is their
only source of income excluding income from child labour), which is less than the critical
wage , *W , and therefore send many of their children to the job market to supplement
low family income. For the sake of simplicity, we assume that capital-owners and land-
owners are separate classes and they do not supply any child labour.16
The supply function of child labour by each poor working family (all assumed to be
identical) is determined from the utility maximizing behaviour of the representative
altruistic household who works as wage labour in any of the agricultural sectors. We
assume that each working family consists of one adult member and ‘n’ number of
children. The altruistic adult member of the family (guardian) decides the number of
children to be sent to the workplace ( )Cl . The utility function of the household is given by
))(,,,( 321 ClnCCCUU 
The household derives utility from the consumption of the three commodities, iC s and
from the children’s leisure. For analytical simplicity let us consider the following Cobb-
Douglas type of the utility function.
 )()()()( 321 ClnCCCAU  (8)
with 0A , 0,,,1   ; and, .1)(  
It satisfies all the standard properties and it is homogeneous of degree 1.
The household maximizes its utility subject to the following budget constraint.
21 1 2 3 3 ( )C CPC P C PC W l W    (9)
16 Alternatively, one can assume that rental incomes are equally divided among the L number of
working families. Consequently, share of rental incomes enters into the household maximization
exercise.
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where, W is the income of the adult worker and CC lW measures the income from child
labour and 2P  is the Issue Price (Consumers’ Price) of commodity 2  determined by the
government.17
Maximizing the utility function with respect to its arguments and subject to the above
budget constraint and solving for Cl the following family child labour supply function can
be derived.18
{(1 ) ( / )}C Cl n W W    (10)
From (10) it is easy to check that Cl varies negatively with the adult wage rate, W . A rise
in W produces a positive income effect so that the adult worker chooses more leisure for
his children and therefore decides to send a fewer number of children to the workplace.
An increase in CW , on the other hand, implies increased opportunity cost of leisure and
therefore produces a negative substitution effect, which increases the supply of child
labour from each family.19
In our model there are )( 33 XaLL LI   number of adult workers engaged in the two
agricultural (informal) sectors and each of them sends Cl  number of children to the
workplace. Thus, the aggregate supply function of child labour in the economy is given
by
3 3[(1 ) ( / )]( )C C LL n W W L a X       (11)
2.2. The General Equilibrium Analysis
17 The difference between the Producers Support Price and the Issue Price is the subsidy
multiplied by quantity of production is the burden of the government, source of which has been
kept exogenous in our model for the sake of simplicity. The subsidy may, however, be financed
by imposing lump-sum taxes on capitalists, landowners and the richer section of the working
class employed in the manufacturing sector of the economy.
18
 See Appendix I for mathematical derivations.
19
 It may be checked that the results of this paper hold for any utility function generating a supply
function of child labour that satisfies these two properties.
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Using (11), equation (7) can be rewritten as
2 2 3 3[(1 ) ( / )]( )C C La X n W W L a X      (7.1)
The general equilibrium structure of the economy is represented by equations (1) – (6),
(7.1) and (11). There are eight endogenous variables in the system:
1 2 3, , , , , ,CW W R r X X X and CL and the same number of independent equations (namely
equations (1)  (6), (7.1) and (11). The parameters in the system are:
2 3, , , , , , , , ,P P L K N W     and n . Equations (1)  (3) constitute the price system. This is
an indecomposable system with three price equations and four factor prices, , ,CW W r and
R . So factor prices depend on both commodity prices and factor endowments. Given the
child wage rate, sectors 1 and 2 together effectively form a modified Heckscher-Ohlin
system as they use both adult unskilled labour and land in their production. Given the
price and the unionised wage W , r is determined from equation (3). Now
1 2, , , ,CW W R X X  and 3X are simultaneously obtained from equation (1), (2), (4) – (6) and
(7.1).  Finally, CL is determined from (11).
3. Comparative Statics
As discussed earlier agriculture in many countries, especially backward agriculture in
developing countries is supported by different government subsidies. The primary
objective of such a fiscal support is poverty alleviation. As these policies are designed to
benefit the poorer section of the working population, conventional wisdom suggests that
these measures will raise the adult income of the poor households which in turn will put a
brake on the problem of child labour in the society. This section is aimed at examining
the efficacy of a price subsidy policy (in the form of increasing the Minimum Support
Price) in mitigating the child labour problem in the economy.
12
For determining the consequences of the price subsidy policy to backward agriculture on
factor prices and output composition after totally differentiating equations (1), (2), (4) –
(6) and (7.1) and solving by Cramer’s rule we can establish the following proposition.20
Proposition 1: A price subsidy to backward agriculture leads to (i) increases in both
adult wage,W , and child wage, CW ; (ii) a fall in the )/( CWW  ratio and an expansion (a
contraction) of the backward (advanced) agricultural sector. The manufacturing sector
contracts if 121 12 1{ } 0KL N L LLNLS S    ⁯21.
Proposition 1 can be explained in economic terms in the following fashion. As r  is
determined from the zero-profit condition for sector 3 (equation (3)) and remains
unchanged despite a change in 2P , sectors 1 and 2 together can effectively be regarded as
a Modified Hechscher-Ohlin subsystem (MHOSS) because they use two common inputs:
adults labour and land. The modification is due to the fact that apart from adult labour
and land sector 2 uses child labour and sector 1 uses capital as inputs.  An increase in the
producer price of commodity 2, 2P , lowers the rate of return to land, R  and raises the
adult wage, W following a Stolper-Samuelson type  effect, as sector 2 is more adult
labour-intensive than sector 1 with respect to land. As adult wage rate increases
producers in sector 1 substitute adult labour by capital while their counterparts in sector 2
substitute adult labour by child labour. As the adult labour-output ratios ( 1La and 2La ) in
the two agricultural sectors fall the availability of adult labour to the MHOSS rises that in
turn produces an expansionary (a contractionary) effect on sector 2 (sector 1) following a
20 See Appendix II for detailed derivations.
21
 Here kjiS is the degree of substitution between factors j and i in the k th sector
with 0kjiS for ij  ; and, 0kjjS  while ji is the allocative share of j th input in i th sector.
Besides, 12 1 2 1 2( ) 0N L L NNL        as the backward agriculture (sector 2) is more adult
labour-intensive vis-à-vis the advanced agriculture (sector 1) with respect to land.
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Rybczynski type effect. As backward agriculture expands the demand for child labour
increases as child labour is specific to that sector. This raises the child wage rate ( CW ).
As both W and CW increase there would be two opposite effects on the supply of child
labour by each poor working families. It is easy to check that the proportionate increase
in child wage rate is greater than that in adult wage so that )/( CWW falls.22 What happens
to sector 3 will be determined by movement of capital between sector 1 and sector 3. As
adult wage rate increases, with given rate of interest and constant land coefficient, wage-
rental ratio in the advanced agricultural sector increases and producers in sector 1
substitute adult labour by capital resulting in an increase in 1Ka . But as sector 1 has
contracted the net effect on the use of capital in this sector is ambiguous. However, it can
be proved that use of capital increases (decreases) in sector 1 (sector 3) under the
sufficient condition that 121 12 1{ } 0KL N L LLNLS S    . Consequently, sector 3 contracts.23
3.1 Price subsidy to backward agriculture and incidence of child labour
For examining the implication of the subsidy policy on the incidence of child labour in
the economy we use the aggregate child labour supply function, which is given by
equation (11). We note that any policy affects the supply of child labour in two ways: (i)
through a change in the size of the adult labour force employed in the two agricultural
sectors, )( 33 XaLL LI  , as these families are considered to be the suppliers of child
labour; and, (ii) through a change in Cl (the number of child workers supplied by each
poor family), which results from a change in the ( / )CW W ratio. Differentiating equation
(11) the following proposition can be proved.24
22 This result is consistent with specific factor models. For an understanding of how return to
intersectorally mobile factors and specific factors react to changes in relative commodity prices,
one can go through Jones (1971). See Appendix II for mathematical proof.
23 Note that the capital-output ratio in sector 3 ( 3Ka ) is given as r does not change.
24 This has been mathematically proved in Appendix IV.
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Proposition 2: A price subsidy policy directed towards backward agriculture worsens
the problem of child labour in the economy either if 121 12 1{ } 0KL N L LLNLS S    ; or if,
2 1 2 1
LC KL CC LLS S S S .
As explained previously, a price subsidy policy to backward agriculture lowers the
)/( CWW ratio, which in turn increases the supply of child labour from each poor working
family. On the other hand, as the formal sector contracts in terms of output and
employment (under the sufficient condition mentioned earlier) the number of poor
working families, which are considered to be the suppliers of child labour, )( 33 XaL L ,
increases.   So, we have a situation where there are more poor families each supplying an
increased number on child worker. Therefore, a price subsidy to backward agriculture
aggravates the problem of child labour in the society.
We now turn our attention to examine implication of a Price Support Policy to backward
agriculture on the welfare of the child labour-supplying families. We capture this using
the family utility function. We substitute the optimum values of consumption of
commodities ( 1 2,C C and 3C ) and children’s leisure ( )Cn l  into the family utility
function and then totally differentiating and rearranging terms the following proposition25
can be established.
Proposition 3: A price support policy to backward agriculture unambiguously
improves the welfare of the child labour-supplying families.
A price support given to backward agriculture raises both the adult wage, W and child
wage, CW . This generates income effect which leads to increased consumption of all the
physical commodities ( 1 2,C C and 3C ). The children’s leisure, ( )Cn l , also increases due
to positive income effect. But as the opportunity cost of leisure ( CW ) rises, leisure falls
due to a negative price effect. As )/( CWW ratio falls, the price effect dominates over the
25 For mathematical derivation see Appendix V.
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income effect. The net outcome would be a decrease in children’s leisure and hence an
increase in the supply of child labour ( Cl ) by each family. This works negatively on
welfare of the family. However, our analysis shows that the increase in family welfare
caused due to rise in physical commodities dominates over the decrease in utility
resulting from a fall in children’s leisure.
4. Quest for alternative policies
What alternative policies this theoretical analysis recommends in combating the problem
of child labour is the crucial question, the answer to which the present section attempts to
provide. We have already demonstrated that a policy which only targets the supply side
of the child labour problem may not be effective in mitigating the prevalence of the evil
in the system. This is because a policy that encourages backward agriculture to grow does
not only increase the non-child labour income (adult income) but also boosts up the
demand for child labour. A policy that addresses the supply side as well as the demand
side of the problem is likely to be effective under the given circumstances. Mechanized
farming should be encouraged that lowers the demand for child labour. One such
alternative policy could be growth with foreign capital. To capture the effects of foreign
direct investment (FDI) flows26 totally differentiating equations (1), (2), (4) – (6) and
(7.1) and solving by Cramer’s rule we get the following result.27
Proposition 4: An inflow of foreign capital leads to (i) an increase in adult wage, W ;
(ii) a fall in  child wage, CW ; (iii) an increase in the )/( CWW  ratio; and, (iv) and an
expansion (a contraction) of the advanced (backward) agricultural sector. The
manufacturing sector also expands owing to capital inflows. All these lead to an
unambiguous fall in the aggregate supply of child labour in the economy.
An FDI inflow raises the capital stock of the economy. But the rate of return to capital
does not change as it is determined from equation (3). Both the capital-using sectors i.e.
26
 Here foreign capital and domestic capital have been assumed to be perfect substitutes.
27 For mathematical derivations see Appendices II and III.
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sector 1 and sector 3 expand.28 This raises the demand for adult labour. Consequently, the
adult wage in the two agricultural sectors,W , rises. This lowers the return to land, R (see
equation (1)). For supplying additional land required for expansion of sector 1, sector 2
has to contract. The contracting backward agriculture (sector 2) also supplies the extra
adult labour to the expanding other two sectors. The demand for child labour goes down
that lowers the child wage rate, CW . AsW rises and CW  falls the relative adult wage
)/( CWW increases unambiguously29 which in turn lowers the supply of child labour by
each poor working household. On the other hand, as sector 3 has expanded both in terms
of output and employment the number of poor working families engaged in the two
agricultural sectors falls.   So, we have a situation where there are fewer potential child
labour supplying families with each of them sending a fewer number of children to
workplace. Thus, both the forces work together and result in an unambiguous fall in the
aggregate supply of child labour in the society.
The welfare effect of an FDI led growth also works in favour of the child labour-
supplying families.30 As mentioned earlier an FDI raises the competitive adult wage (W )
but lowers child wage rate ( CW ).  An increase in adult wage income generates a positive
income effect that raises consumption of all the commodities including children’s leisure,
( Cn l ). The latter rises even further as its opportunity cost ( CW ) decreases. Welfare of
each family improves unequivocally as consumption levels of all commodities including
children’s leisure increase.
It is worthwhile in this connection to point out that a policy of directly subsidizing
advanced agriculture in the form of a price and/or a credit subsidy will also be effective
in lessening the gravity of the child labour problem but at the cost of lowering the adult
28
 See Appendix III.
29
 See Appendix II.
30 See Appendix V for mathematical proofs of this result.
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wage rate and family welfare. A mere inspection of the price system (equations (1) – (3))
reveals that a price and/or a credit subsidy to advanced agriculture effectively raises the
relative price of commodity 1. This produces a Stolper-Samuelson effect in the MHOSS
that results in an increase in the return to land, R  and a decrease in the adult wage, W  as
sector 1 is more land-intensive  relative to sector 2 with respect to adult labour. This
produces an expansionary (a contractionary) effect on sector 1 (sector 2). As sector 2
contracts the demand for child labour goes down as it is specific to this sector.
Consequently, the child wage rate falls. It is easy to check that the proportionate fall in
child wage rate is greater than that in adult wage so that )/( CWW rises. This lowers the
supply of child labour by each poor working family, Cl . It can be shown
31
 that under the
sufficient condition that 121 12 1{ } 0KL N L LLNLS S    sector 3 expands. So, we can have a
situation where there are a fewer families with each of them supplying a lower number of
child workers. Consequently, the aggregate supply of child labour falls at the cost of
further impoverishment32 of the child labour supplying families. This establishes the final
proposition of the model.
Proposition 5: A price and/or a credit subsidy policy to advanced agriculture succeeds
in bringing down the prevalence of child labour in the society under the sufficient
condition that 121 12 1{ } 0KL N L LLNLS S    . However, this policy lowers the family welfare
of the child labour-supplying families.
5. Concluding remarks
The paper has provided a theoretical explanation as to why policies that affect only the
supply side of the child labour problem may not be able in alleviating the incidence of
31
 Interested readers can easily check this after going through Appendices II and III.
32 Note that bothW and CW fall due to the policy. Aggregate income of each family unequivocally
plummets as Cl falls too. As family welfare is a positive function of W and CW , (see Appendix:
V), welfare of the child labour-supplying families deteriorates.
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child labour in a developing economy. Poverty alleviation programs are often
recommended to fight against child labour as it is thought to be an outcome of utter
poverty. It is a common belief that backward agriculture should be subsidized as poorer
groups of the working population are employed in this sector who send many of their
children out to work to supplement low family incomes. If the economic conditions of
these people can be improved the social menace of child could automatically be
mitigated. The analysis of this paper has challenged this populist belief using a three-
sector general equilibrium model with child labour and agricultural dualism. The
advanced agriculture is distinguished from backward agriculture as follows. The former
uses capital in the form of agricultural machineries that prevents child labour to work on
these farms. On the contrary, backward agriculture uses primitive techniques of
cultivation and employs child labour in a significant number. Apart from this, backward
agriculture uses more labour-intensive (adult labour) technique vis-à-vis advanced
agriculture with respect to land. In this set-up we have shown that a price subsidy policy
designed to benefit the poorer section of the working population that affects the child
labour problem only through the supply side cannot ultimately be able to deliver the
goods. Although the policy exerts a downward pressure on the child labour incidence
through the supply side by raising adult wage income it increases the demand for child
labour through an expansion of backward agriculture. But as the demand side effect
dominates over the supply side effect the incidence of child labour gets a boost. On the
contrary, a policy of overall economic growth in the form of an FDI is able to put
downward pressures on the child labour problem both through the demand and supply
sides. Not only it lessens the supply of child labour by raising non-child labour (adult
wage) income of the poor families but also lowers the demand for child labour by
expanding (contracting) advanced (backward) agriculture. Besides, the policy also
unequivocally improves welfare of the child labour-supplying families. Our results,
therefore, demonstrate that liberalized investment policies should be strictly preferred to
poverty lessening measures both from the view points of poverty alleviation and
reduction in the incidence of child labour in the developing nations.
19
Appendix I: Derivation of family supply function of child labour
Maximizing equation (8) with respect to 321 ,, CCC and Cl  and subject to the budget constraint
(9) the following first-order conditions are obtained.
21 1 2 3 3(( ) / ( )) (( ) / ( )) (( ) / ( )) (( ) / ( ) )C CU PC U P C U PC U n l W                           (A.1)
From (A.1) we get the following expressions.
)}/()({ 11 PWlnC CC                      (A.2)
22 { ( ) / ( )}C CC n l W P                                                                                                     (A.3)
)}/()({ 33 PWlnC CC                      (A.4)
Substitution of the values of 1C , 2C and 3C into the budget constraint and further simplifications
give us the following child labour supply function of each poor working household.
{(1 ) ( / )}C Cl n W W              (10)
Appendix II: Changes in factor prices
As r is determined from equation (3), it is independent of any changes in 2P and K . In other
words, we have ˆ 0.r 
Now we totally differentiate equations (1), (2), (4) – (6) and (7.1), collecting terms and arranging
in a matrix notation we get the following expression.
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2 2 2
2
2 1 2 3
1
1 1 3
1 2
2 2 3
3
0 0 0 0
0 0 0
0
0 0 0
0 0 0 0
( ) 0 ( ) 0 1 (1 )
L N
L N C
LL L LC L L L
K KL K K
N N
L
CL CC
C C C C L
S S
S
W WS S
l W l W
 
  
   
  
 
 

            
1
2
3
ˆ
ˆ
ˆ
ˆ
ˆ
ˆ
C
W
R
W
X
X
X
           
=
2
0
ˆ
0
ˆ
0
0
P
K
          
  (A.5)
where,
1 2
1 2( ) 0;LL L LL L LLS S S   
2 2
2 1 2 1 2 1 2[{ ( ) }( )L LC CC L N N L
C C
WS A S A
l W
        
1 2
1 2 1 1 3 2{ ( ) }] 0N C LL K KL CL
C C
WS A S A S A
l W
      
                                                                               (A.6)
2 3 1 2 1 2 1 3 2( ) 0K N L L N K L NA           
3 1
3 2 3 1 1 3 1
3 3
1 ( ) 0
1 1
L L
N L L N L L
L L
A            
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1 2 1 2( ) 0N L L NNL        as we have assumed that the backward agricultural sector is more
adult labour-intensive vis-à-vis the advanced agricultural sector with respect to land both in
physical and value sense. The latter implies that 1 2 1 2( ) 0L N N L      which in turn shows that
0  .
Solving (A.5) by Cramer’s rule the following expressions are obtained.
2 2
2 1 2 1 2 1 2 3
1 1ˆ ˆ ˆ{ ( ) }L LC CC N N C
C C
WW S A S A P A K
l W
          (A.7)
           (─)            (+)         (─)          (+)     (+)       (─)          (+)
1 2
1 1 3 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 3
1 1ˆ ˆ ˆ{ ( ) } ( )C LL K KL CL N L N N L
C C
WW S A S A S A P A K
l W
            (A.8)
3
1 1 2 1 3
3
( ) 0
1
L
K N N K
L
A      
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          (─) (─)(+)             (+)           (+)         (+)  (+)       (─)          (─)         (+)
2 2
2 1 2 1 2 1 2 3
1 1ˆ ˆ ˆ{ ( ) }L LC CC L L C
C C
WR S A S A P A K
l W
                         (A.9)
       (─)           (+)          (─)          (+)   (+)     (─)        (+)
Now subtraction of (A.8) from (A.7) yields
2 2 2 1
1 2 2 1 3 1 2
1ˆ ˆ ˆ( ) [ ( ) ( ) )]C L LC LL CC CL K KL NW W A S S A S S S A P        
1 2 1 2 1 2 3
1 ˆ{ ( )}N C L N N L A K       
Using the expression of LLS from (A.6) we can further simplify the expression of ˆ ˆ( )CW W as
follows.
1 1
1 1 1 3 1 2
1ˆ ˆ ˆ( ) [ ]C L LL K KL NW W A S S A P     
                       (─) (+)   (─)               (+)      (+)
1 2 1 2 1 2 3
1 ˆ{ ( )}N C L N N L A K        (A.10)
                                                  (─)                            (─)            (+)
[Note that 2 2( ) 0CC CLS S   and 2 2( ) 0LL LCS S  , (note that as 2Na is constant 2 0CNS  and
2 0LNS  .]
Using (A.6), from (A.7) – (A.9) and (A.10) we can obtain the following results.
(i) ˆ ˆ0, 0W R   and ˆ 0CW  when 2ˆ 0P  ;
(ii) ˆ ˆ( ) 0CW W   when 2ˆ 0P 
(iii) ˆ ˆ0, 0W R   and ˆ 0CW  when ˆ 0K  ;            (A.11)
(iv) ˆ ˆ( ) 0CW W    when ˆ 0K 
Appendix III: Changes in output composition
Solving (A.5) by Cramer’s Rule we can derive the following expressions as well.
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Or,
2 1 1 2 13
1 1 3 1 3 2 1 1 2 2
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C C L
WX S S S S S P
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                  (─)          (─)                 (─)                                                         (+)                    (+)
2
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1 2 3 2
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       (A.12)
                                                                         (─)            (+)
2 1 1 2 13
2 1 3 1 3 2 1 1 1 2
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L
CC L LL K K KL L L LC K KL N N
C C L
WX S S S S S P
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             (─)                (+)
[We have used the expression of LLS  and note that
2 2 0LC LLS S   and 2 2 0CC CLS S  ]
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Or,
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                        (─)        (+)                 (─)                        (+)                         (─)
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ˆ{ ( )( )}]N C LL N CL N L L N
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                                          (─)                 (+)                      (+)
From (A.12) - (A.14) we get the following
(v) 1 2ˆ ˆ0, 0X X  when 2ˆ 0P  ;
(vi) 3ˆ 0X  when 2ˆ 0P 
under the sufficient condition that 121 12 1{ } 0KL N L LLNLS S           (A.15)
(vii) 1 2ˆ ˆ0, 0X X  when ˆ 0K  ;
(viii) 3ˆ 0X  when ˆ 0K  .
Also note that 3 3ˆ ˆK X where 3 3 3KK a X  (this is because 3ˆ 0Ka  ). So,
(ix) 3ˆ 0K  when 2ˆ 0P  ; and, (A.16)
(x) 3ˆ 0K  when ˆ 0K  .
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Appendix IV: Proof of proposition 3
Totally differentiating equation (11) we get the following
3
3
3
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ( ) (1 )
L
C C
C C L
WL W W X
l W

    
We now substitute the expressions of 3Xˆ   and ˆ ˆ( )CW W    from (A.14) and (A.10) respectively
to get the following expression.
1 1
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           (─)                        (─)               (+)
122 1 2 1 13
2 1 2 1 1
3
{ ( )( )} ](1 )
L
L LC KL N CC KL N L LL KNL
L C C
WS S S S S
l W
           1 2ˆN P      (A.17)
                                          (+)                     (─)                 (+)                   (─)  (+)
From (A.17) we get the following results.
ˆ 0CL  when 2ˆ 0P   under the sufficient condition 121 12 1{ } 0KL N L LLNLS S   
Rewriting (A.17) in a different way it can be checked that the above result also hold under the
sufficient condition that 2 1 2 1LC KL CC LLS S S S .
Appendix V: Effects on family welfare
We substitute the optimum values of consumption of commodities ( 1 2,C C and 3C ) (from
equations (A.2)-(A.4)) and children’s leisure ( )Cn l ( from equation (10)) into the utility
function (equation (8)) to get the following expression.
( )
( )
C
C
nW WV H
W 
                                       (A.18)
 where V stands for family welfare and
1 2 3
( ) ( ) ( ) 0H A
P P P
        
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Totally differentiating the above expression we get the following.
ˆ ˆ( )ˆ
( )
C C C
C
l W W WWV
nW W
                                                   (A.19)
From the above expression it is clear that family welfare is an increasing function of both
W and CW .
We now substitute Wˆ and ˆCW  from (A.7) and (A.8) into (A.19) to get the following.
2 2 1
2 1 2 1 1 3
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(-)                            (+)                  (-)   (-)           (+)
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   1 2 2 1 2 31 ˆ[ ( ) ]( ) N C C C L C C L NC W l W l W A KnW W            (A.20)
(+)       (+)                (-)           (+)           (+)
Now from (A.20) we have
2 2 2
2 2 2 2 2
2 2 1 1 2 2
( ) ( )[ ] ( )[ ]( )
C C L C
C C C L C C C C
L L
WW WW a a XW l W a a l a
P P a X a X
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2 1 1
1 1 2 2
( ) 0.C L
L L
W a X
a X a X
  (A.21)
(obtained after using (4), (7), (10) and (11).)
From (A.20) and (A.21) we can obtain the following results.
(i) ˆ 0V   when 2ˆ 0P  ;
(ii) ˆ 0V   when ˆ 0K  .
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